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I. Introduction
Politics has been characterized as the struggle for \who gets what, when, and how,"1 and political science is
the study of how that struggle is conducted and resolved. Since there is so much to \get" when it comes to
the industries regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (\FDA"),2 it is somewhat surprising that rel-
atively little study of FDA has been undertaken by political scientists. In describing what political scientists
can add to the study of regulatory policy apart from the contributions of economists, lawyers, sociologists,
and journalists, renowned political scientist Morris Fiorina noted that while these other professionals typi-
cally study behavior undertaken within the constraints imposed by government ocials, political scientists
ask why the constraints are imposed in the rst place and consider externally-imposed constraints as only one
factor in determining why a government or a governmental unit behaves the way it does.3 This essay collects
and analyzes the important political science works on FDA, with an eye both to serving as a springboard
for future research on FDA decision-making and to drawing conclusions from extant research.
1See, e.g., Harold D. Lasswell, Politics { Who Gets What, When, How (1958).
2FDA-regulated products account for twenty-ve cents of ever consumer dollar spent in the United States.
See Food and Drug Administration, About the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (visited January 13, 2001)
<http://www.fda.gov/opacom/hpview.html>.
3See Morris P. Fiorina, Group Concentration and the Delegation of Legislative Authority, in Regulatory Policy and the
Social Sciences 173, 173-74 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1985).
1Both of these goals require a brief discussion of \explanatory frameworks;" the future researcher will ap-
preciate a conceptual categorization of the political science literature, and any analysis of existing studies
should at least make explicit which framework those studies implicitly adopt. Social scientists have de-
vised many sets of explanatory frameworks for analyzing government decision-making, and a good beginning
reference point is Theodore R. Marmor's Commentary, or the Notes and Asides of an FDA Amateur and
Professional Political Scientist Specializing in Battles over the Modern Welfare State.4 Marmor denes ex-
planatory frameworks (or \conceptual models") as the \intellectual orientation and conceptual categories
the analyst brings to complex political and organizational phenomena: how problems are framed, what unit
of analysis is presumed, what focal notions, and what patterns of inference,"5 and he rightly criticizes other
writers on FDA for failing to be precise about their own explanatory frameworks.
Basing his discussion on a well-known work by Graham Allison,6 Marmor describes three such frameworks:
the \rational (or unitary) actor model," the \organizational process model," and the \bureaucratic politics
model."7 The rational actor model, as its name might imply, views FDA as merely a representative of the
government.8 Under this model, when FDA takes some action or stance, it does so because the government
as a whole has made a strategic choice that this action or stance was the best under the circumstances.
Particularly relevant to this sort of analysis are the policy reasons behind certain regulations, enforcement
mechanisms, and approval patterns. The organizational process model directs its attention to the laws and
habits that form the processes a unit or sub-unit of government (here, FDA) follows. While the rational
482 Va. L. Rev. 1867 (1996).
5Id. at 1870.
6Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971).
7Marmor, supra note 4, at 1870-71. It should be emphasized that this set of explanatory frameworks is not the only set that
has been formulated, but it is one of the best known.
8This idea has also been expressed by the \principle-agent model" of bureaucratic functioning. For a survey of the literature
adopting this view, see B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, Bureaucratic Dynamics 22-26 (1994).
2actor model might explain an FDA regulation by focusing on the reasons why such a regulation might
objectively be a good idea, the organizational process model pays more attention to \what reasons made
sense to a particular organization with its distinctive habits, routine channels of information, and crucial
internal history."9 Finally, the bureaucratic politics model emphasizes the interaction of individual actors in
\bargaining games."10 This model explains a given FDA action \as the momentary resultant (or vector) of
individuals, interests, and interactions."11
Before the political science literature is discussed using these explanatory frameworks, a few cautionary
notes are warranted. First, the frameworks are not mutually exclusive. A scholar can analyze FDA decision-
making using more than one. This is because the frameworks are not competing explanations of how FDA
works; rather, they are simply dierent ways of sifting through a nearly innite pool of data to determine
what is important. Therefore, this essay can at most suggest which framework is the most useful vis- a-vis
FDA; it cannot say which is \right." Second, all conceptual models blur at the edges. Political scientists are
sometimes not explicit about what they believe is important in the picture they present, and they include
dierent sorts of facts that are primary for dierent frameworks. Moreover, even if they attempted to conne
their descriptions to a single model, the models themselves would often not oblige. For example, historical
information, depending on its presentation, can suggest either a unitary government view (as it has been
categorized here) or an organizational habits and routines view; likewise, information about FDA's incentives
can be relevant both to the latter view and to the bureaucratic politics model. Finally, a few works t so
awkwardly into any one of these models that they are categorized separately below.
9Id. at 1871.
10Id.
11Id. at 1872.
3II. The Rational Actor Model
Political science works that rely heavily on history to explain why certain decisions were made about how
to regulate food or drugs, and why the system is as it is now, generally assume a monolithic decision-maker
{ the government { responding to outside events and reacting as any rational actor put in the government's
place would act. Thus in her book Strategic Uses of Public Policy, Donna Wood describes the \public
outrage" hypothesis of FDA regulation.12 This hypothesis explains food and drug law as a response to
various events that bring problems to the government's attention. For example, Wood evaluates the impact
of Upton Sinclair's The Jungle (1905): \Theodore Roosevelt... sent his own blue-ribbon investigatory team
to conrm Sinclair's ctional account, and the Meat Inspection Act raced through Congress and was signed
by the President on June 30, 1906."13 Likewise, the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (\FDCA") was a
governmental response to the Elixir Sulfanilamide deaths, and the 1962 amendments to that act were passed
because of the phocomelia-causing drug thalidomide.14 Political economist Robert Higgs runs through the
same crisis-response list, although he calls this process \punctuated politics" instead of the \public outrage"
hypothesis.15
Peter Temin's Taking Your Medicine16 is a more general history than Wood's, and it is unique in the way
he uses the history of food and drug regulation in conjunction with a psycho-social model of politics to
understand FDA decision-making. In his model Temin posits three decision-making methods.17 First, the
12Donna J. Wood, Strategic Uses of Public Policy: Business and Government in the Progressive Era 6-9 (1986).
Despite this book's broad title, the entire work is on the regulation of food and drugs in the progressive era.
13Id. at 6. Wood questions, however, the commonly-held notion that the Pure Food Act of 1906 (although it became law
the same day) was also spurred on by The Jungle. She advances other reasons (consistent with the rational actor model) for
its passage. Id. at 6-7.
14Id. at 7.
15Robert Higgs, Introduction to Hazardous to our Health? FDA Regulation of Health Care Products 1, 2-3 (Robert
Higgs ed., 1995).
16Peter Temin, Taking Your Medicine: Drug Regulation in the United States (1980).
17Id. at 163-66.
4\instrumental" method is characterized by the denition of goals and the rational assessment of various
strategies to meet those goals. The \customary" method, on the other hand, uses habit or tradition as the
guidepost. Finally, the \command" method describes the situation where the decision-maker abdicates the
decision to another entity. Furthermore, the model used by the decision-maker changes depending on the
context. To use Temin's own example, a perfectly healthy person maintains health (i.e., eats, sleeps, etc.)
using the \customary" method; if that person becomes mildly ill, he or she might use the \instrumental"
method in deciding what to do (i.e., consciously deciding whether to take a pill, stay in bed, etc.); and if
that person should become seriously ill, he or she might use the \command" method by abdicating health
decisions to a doctor.
Temin's model also describes three institutional structures in which decisions are made using the three
decision-making methods.18 A \hierarchy" exists when decision-making entities are arranged in clear power
relationships where one entity gives orders and another follows them. A \market" exists when people or rms
come together to bargain for mutually-agreeable exchanges. A \community" exists when entities interact
\informally or continually on more or less equal footing."19
While any of the above modes of behavior can t into any institutional structure, some ts are uncomfortable.
For example, command decision-making ts rather poorly in a community relationship (where customary
behavior works much better), and instrumental decision-making ts more comfortably in a market structure
than it does in a hierarchy.20 Temin asserts that tensions created when the institutional structure and the
decision-making model do not mesh result in pressures to change the institutional structure, not the mode
18Id. at 177-79.
19Id. at 177.
20Id. at 180.
5of behavior.21 So, when personal characteristics combine with unanticipated changes in the outside world to
alter the average person's decision-making method, the institutional structure is pushed to transform into a
structure more compatible with the behavioral mode.
After articulating his model, Temin uses it to explain the history of congressional and FDA regulation he
provides in the rest of the book. For example, Temin states that \the Depression and the war induced a desire
for more directed behavior."22 The increasing pace of drug discoveries (including sulfa drugs in the 1930s and
antibiotics after the war) made expert guidance more necessary. Thus, according to Temin, the 1938 FDCA
was designed to establish a hierarchic structure to accommodate the growing culture of command-model
decision-making.23 Temin uses his model to explicate other FDA regulatory actions and to try to determine
how FDA will react to future changes. In particular, Temin makes an important contribution to the \drug
lag" debate by shedding light on the conicting behavior-model assumptions underlying both sides, and he
attempts to use the model to anticipate how FDA { or Congress { will respond to growing pressure (borne
of increasingly instrumental consumer behavior with regard to drug selection) to speed drug approval.24
The historical works by Wood, Higgs, and Temin do not adopt the rational actor viewpoint in its purest
form. That role is fullled best by legislative and regulatory preambles, law casebooks, judicial decisions,
or anything else that states the goals of regulation and how the current regulatory scheme achieves those
goals, all of which are easy for the researcher to nd. While the rational actor model does not preclude
disharmony within the government (if it did, it would be uselessly naive), it largely treats such disharmony
as peripheral to the main thrust of governmental unity. Wood and Higgs at points both ascribe importance
21Id. at 179.
22Id. at 198.
23Id. at 199.
24Id. at 206-15.
6to that disharmony. And while Temin pays relatively less attention to disunity than the others, his model
makes FDA regulation as much a product of collective psychological urges than one of rational means-ends
reasoning. Nevertheless, these historical works display a greater tendency to view food, drug, and cosmetic
regulation as the product of a single-minded government reacting to various inuences than the rest of the
pieces described in this essay.
III. The Organizational Process Model
Most general theories of agency behavior adopt the organizational process model as their construct. Some
political scientists focus on the extent to which Congress is able to control agency behavior,25 while others
pay more attention to agency responsiveness to non-governmental pressures.26 Since these theories explain
FDA decision-making in terms of FDA's organization-level response to certain incentive structures imposed
by various entities, and since they seem applicable regardless of personality changes at FDA, they are in-
cluded in this classication. Two political scientists in particular { Professors Mary Olson at Yale University
and Dan Carpenter at the University of Michigan { are doing fascinating empirical analyses of FDA decision-
making at the organizational level.
One of Olson's earliest works, complaining that \few studies have attempted to test among the competing
theories of agency behavior,"27 tests for determinants of FDA approval decisions in three dierent industries:
brand-name drugs, generic drugs, and medical devices. The determinants for which she tests include agency
25See generally Barry Weingast & Mark Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control: Regulatory Policymaking
by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 765 (1983) (arguing that agencies are motivated primarily by the
preferences of the congressional committees that oversee them because of the rewards and sanctions those committees are
capable of dispensing to the agencies); Terry Moe, Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB, 28
Am. J. Pol. Sci. 1094 (1985) (arguing that institutional culture and superior expertise make agencies relatively independent
from congressional control).
26Perhaps the most important of this branch of theories is the \capture" theory advanced by George Stigler in The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 2 (1971).
27Mary Olson, Regulatory Agency Discretion Among Competing Industries: Inside FDA 2 (Center for American
Politics and Public Policy Occasional Paper Series No. 94-4, 1994).
7budget, congressional preferences, and several measures of both industry interests and consumer interests.
Her results suggest that dierent theories of agency behavior are \correct," depending on the type of product
for which approval is sought.
First, the coecients on the FDA budget variables in all three approval categories are statistically signi-
cant, meaning that the size of FDA's budget aects how quickly all three regulated articles are approved.
Interestingly, the only positive coecient for FDA's budget is in the category of generic drug applications;
specically, a one percent increase in agency budget would lead to a 1.01 percent increase in the number of
generic drug approvals in any given year.28 Budget constraints will not, therefore, slow the approval rate
for brand-name drugs or medical devices. Olson implies that the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associa-
tion may have discovered this relationship earlier, explaining their attempt to limit FDA's budget (to stie
generic drug approval) after the 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act.29
Olson shows that congressional preferences and the public interest both aect FDA approval speed. Olson
uses the ADA30 scores of House and Senate oversight committee members to measure their preferences for
more or less restrictive regulations for the three categories of medical technology. The higher the ADA score
for the median Senate oversight committee member, the more quickly generic drugs are approved.31 The
same is true for House committee members and brand-name drug approval. As the median Senate oversight
28Id. at 29 tbl.2a.
29Id. at 19.
30The group Americans for Democratic Action (\ADA") issues scores for all congressional members based on roll calls, rating
their ideology on a scale from 0 (very conservative) to 100 (very liberal). ADA scores are widely used as a simple proxy for the
political preferences of members of Congress.
31Id. at 29 tbl.2a.
8committee member's ADA score increases, medical devices are approved more slowly.32 As for the public
interest, the death rate for brand-name drugs directly aects their approval rate, and the pharmaceutical
price index aects the approval rate of generic drugs.33
Olson has also examined determinants of FDA's choice of enforcement tools.34 Her ndings demonstrate
what common sense would instruct. For example, budget restrictions and increasing applications for product
approval both result in less FDA monitoring of regulated industries and the use of \cheaper" enforcement
tools in place of more resource-intensive ones.35 Although her ndings are not startling, her explanation for
them is intriguing and reects a clear organizational-process orientation. Olson maintains that \changes in
FDA enforcement strategies occurred because the political benets of pursuing high monitoring and legalistic
enforcement actions diminished over time as rms', consumers', and congressional preferences for more and
faster FDA approvals increased."36 The reason for the selection of less expensive enforcement tools, then,
is not that FDA simply has less money and more work; rather, FDA changed its primary enforcement tools
as a response to signals from Congress37 and from industry that greater political benets would attach to
certain enforcement patterns than to others. Likewise, Olson explains regulatory tightening in response to
periodic scandals not as a rational response to a new problem brought to light (as do others mentioned
above), but instead as FDA's response to increasing political benets to stricter enforcement.
32Id.
33Id.
34See Mary Olson, Substitution in Regulatory Agencies: FDA Enforcement Alternatives, 12 J.L. Econ. & Org. 376 (1996).
35Id. at 404.
36Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added).
37\Signals" from Congress are often the most powerful mechanism for political control of an agency. See, e.g., Daniel P.
Carpenter, Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation, 90 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 283
(1996) (arguing, without specic reference to FDA, that presidents and congressmen achieve budgetary control over agencies
not by manipulating aggregate resource constraints but by transmitting powerful signals through budget shifts; moreover,
bureaucratic hierarchy increases agency response time in processing those signals, limiting ecacy of budget manipulation as a
control tool).
9The determinants registered dierent eects on dierent FDA enforcement tools. For example, the number
of FDA inspections dropped as a result of budget cuts, but the number of FDA seizures did not.38 Olson
would posit that there must be some reason that a reduction in budget does not constitute a sucient polit-
ical incentive for FDA to reduce seizures. More precisely, to understand agency behavior, Olson states that
we must understand the internal trade-os that result in various actions: when FDA's budget is cut, what
trade-os result in a reduction in inspections but not in seizures, or an decrease in generic drug approvals
but not in brand-name drug approvals?39
A separate study by Olson concentrates on the relationship between Congress and FDA, and more specically
on Congress' ability to constrain FDA action.40 There are two general approaches to congressional control of
an agency: ex post monitoring and ex ante administrative or procedural constraints. Olson's study suggests
that the ex ante constraints imposed by the 1962 Amendments to the FDCA limit the direction, but not
the magnitude, of agency \drift" from congressional preferences over time.41 FDA is eectively prevented
from becoming more lenient with respect to new drug approval, but its position is not static; FDA decisions
exhibit, instead, a policy shift in the direction of increased stringency.42 By way of contrast, FDA has fewer
legislative constraints on its generic drug approval process, and there has consequently been a greater uctu-
ation in generic drug approval between leniency and stringency.43 Since there are fewer ex ante constraints
imposed by Congress with regard to generic drug approval, FDA is more open to political pressure (which
includes ex post congressional oversight) and has more discretion to respond to that pressure.
38Id. at 405.
39Id.
40Mary Olson, Explaining Regulatory Behavior in FDA: Political Control vs. Agency Discretion, in 7 Advances in the
Study of Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Economic Growth 71 (Gary Libecap ed., 1996).
41Id. at 73.
42Id.
43Id.
10Institutional culture contributes to the magnitude of FDA's drift toward stringency.44 The professional
concerns of scientists and doctors result in a preference by FDA for maintaining standards versus increasing
speed. As Olson puts it, \an agency staed with doctors who are bound to the Hippocratic Oath will prob-
ably operate very dierently than an agency staed with lawyers or economists."45 Since the composition
of FDA is predetermined by Congress, and since in drafting FDA's mandate Congress chose to focus solely
on safety and ecacy instead of cost eectiveness or other non-scientic concerns, Congress' ex ante control
of FDA has given that agency only one direction to move when resources are constrained.
Congress is nding ex post oversight to be a more and more convenient way of maintaining political control
over FDA, since any changes in the legislative status quo are practically dicult to bring about and since
the informational asymmetry between Congress and FDA is at an all-time high. But congressional oversight
tends to be ineective compared to ex ante control because the worst that can happen to FDA for deviating
from congressional preferences is that its budget can be cut.46 And as Olson has shown in other works,47
such \agency starving" only impacts some kinds of FDA behavior. So, Olson points out, \if politicians want
the agency to be more responsive to industry interests, then politicians need to shift the balance of interest
reected in agency process" (ex ante instead of ex post), as they did with the introduction of user fees in
1992.48
Some of Professor Olson's more recent research suggests that congressional oversight does have important
consequences, regardless of its eectiveness as a mechanism of ex post political control over FDA.49 While
44Id. at 105.
45Id. at 79.
46See id. at 102-03.
47See supra notes 29 and 38 and accompanying text.
48Olson, Explaining Regulatory Behavior in FDA, supra note 40, at 106.
49See Mary K. Olson, Agency Rulemaking, Political Inuences, Regulation, and Industry Compliance, 15 J.L. Econ. &
Org. 573 (1999).
11it should come as no surprise that heightened FDA inspection activity increases industry compliance with
food and drug laws,50 expanded congressional oversight of FDA also appears to increase industry compli-
ance. This is for two reasons. First, increased congressional oversight signals to the industry that Congress
wants food and drug safety laws to be strictly enforced. The second reason is indirect: greater congressional
oversight leads to greater FDA inspection levels. A ten percent increase in oversight hearings results in a
two percent increase in FDA inspections.51 This implies that the reduction in oversight of FDA in the early
1980s contributed to industry non-compliance, and that improved compliance in the late 1980s and early
1990s resulted at least in part from increased congressional oversight of FDA.
Olson wrote one piece that indicates that the characteristics of rms regulated by FDA can serve as signals to
FDA about product quality, and that FDA acts on those heuristics.52 So, all things being equal, rms with
good safety records can get products approved more quickly. Professor Dan Carpenter takes this proposition
a step further: even large (and therefore familiar) rms that have historically below-average safety records
can often get quicker approval than unknown rms.53 This is because, as Carpenter's formal modeling shows,
familiarity advantages are distinct from the rm-specic quality dierentials from which FDA learns.
Carpenter demonstrates that large rms receive regulatory \protection" even without being captured by
50Specically, a ten percent increase in aggregate inspections produces a 7.9 percent reduction in the number of rms violating
FDA regulations. See id. at 589.
51Id. at 593.
52Mary Olson, Firm Characteristics and the Speed of FDA Approval, 6 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 377 (1997). Olson
had also argued that more specialized rms receive quicker approval, but a later work showed that this eect disappeared
with the enactment of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992. See Mary Olson, Regulatory Reform and Bureaucratic
Responsiveness to Firms: The Impact of User Fees in FDA, 9 J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy 363 (2000).
53Daniel P. Carpenter, Protection Without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, Bayesian Regulator 30
(2000) (working paper, on le with author at the Department of Political Science, University of Michigan).
12the industry (that is, even if the regulatory action is for the benet of consumers and not the regulated
industry). There are several reasons why a Bayesian FDA facing a stopping problem54 would act to benet
larger, more established rms.55 First, larger rms have more products already on the market, so FDA will
have less uncertainty about the rm's ability to make any safe products at all. Second, larger rms have
the capital to ll market gaps more quickly, and FDA is likely to respond more quickly to the heightened
consumer pressure associated with a breakthrough drug. Finally, larger rms are benetted indirectly by
FDA's slowness in making stopping decisions. Larger rms have the funds to wait out a long approval
process, while small companies may not, eectively protecting large rms from market entry by small ones.
Carpenter's ndings cast some doubt on the capture theory of agency behavior, at least as applied to FDA.
As Carpenter explains, \commonly adduced evidence for capture and rent-seeking is observationally equiva-
lent to evidence for other models of regulation."56 In other words, while FDA actions that benet large rms
may indicate that FDA has been captured by the rms' superior money and organization, they may also
indicate that FDA is simply a Bayesian regulator facing a stopping problem with incomplete information.
Since uncaptured (or \neutral") agencies can thus unintentionally \bequeath systematic advantages to large
rms," political insulation of an agency may not, as some capture theory adherents claim, create a level
playing eld for rms of all sizes.57
Carpenter focuses more on the central question of the stopping problem { namely, when to decide { in
54Political scientists refer to a decision about when to take a costly action that will be costly to undo as a \stopping
problem." FDA faces the problem of \stopping" drug review only when the payo of approval (including the avoidance of
additional political costs of waiting, as with the AIDS drugs in the late 1980s) exceeds both the utility losses (including FDA's
ercely-guarded reputation) associated with the potential danger of the drug and the value of waiting for more information.
FDA will not, therefore, simply approve the drug when its apparent danger is less than the apparent payo of approval, since
valuable new information about the drug may be just around the corner. According to Carpenter, it is this aspect of FDA
decision-making that dierentiates product approval from more standard problems of administrative choice.
55See id. at 2-3.
56Id. (from abstract).
57Id. at 31.
13another work.58 Indeed, as of the writing of this essay, Carpenter is the only political scientist not to view
FDA decision-making as a static choice among several dierent policy options. This is surprising because,
as Carpenter says, \the political debate over FDA drug approval concerns not whether the agency rejects
or approves too many new drugs, but how long it takes for safe and ecacious drugs to get approved."59
Carpenter's empirical ndings are consistent with his speculations in Protection Without Capture about why
larger rms are disproportionately benetted by FDA regulation.
In particular, FDA is least likely to approve a drug precisely when Carpenter's model suggests that the value
of waiting for more information is the greatest: when the drug is rst submitted.60 FDA is not necessarily
inecient, then, even if it is slow; its decisions simply account for the value of waiting. Second, FDA review
times seem to be shortest when it is reviewing the rst drug submitted for a particular disease, since political
demand (generated by organized consumer groups and media coverage of a disease) for the drug is strongest
when no alternative exists.61 The payo for early approval is greater, the costs of waiting are lower, and the
benets of waiting are the same relative to later drugs.
Carpenter has also researched what inuences the waiting costs that FDA takes into consideration when
deciding when to decide.62 He demonstrates that \political inuence in FDA drug approval occurs less
through ideological and partisan shifts in the agency's oversight institutions (the presidency, Congress and
its committees), and more through organized interests."63 Indeed, oversight committee ideology and parti-
58Daniel P. Carpenter, Bureaucratic Choice as a Stopping Problem: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of FDA Drug
Review (April 1999) (paper prepared for the Midwest Political Science Association Meetings) (on le with author).
59Id. at 2 (emphasis in original).
60Id. at 35.
61Id. at 5.
62Daniel P. Carpenter, Groups, the Media, and Agency Waiting Costs: The Political Economy of FDA Drug Approval (April
2000) (paper prepared for the Midwest Political Science Association Meetings) (on le with author).
63Id. at 2.
14sanship are not correlated to a statistically signicant degree with FDA review times.64 On the other hand,
increased media coverage of a particular disease (as measured by the four-year moving average of Washington
Post stories mentioning the disease) is highly correlated with reduced approval time for a drug relating to
that disease.65 Finally, disease-specic activists can increase FDA's political waiting costs. But it is the
centralization, and not the number, of such groups that counts; one group with substantial wealth is more
eective than many groups with fewer resources.66 In sum, inuences on FDA's waiting costs seem to be
disease-specic and not systematic.
As of the writing of this essay, Professor Carpenter, along with Professor Michael Ting, is in the process of
formalizing an additional dimension to his model of FDA's stopping problem.67
Daniel Carpenter & Michael M. Ting, Product Approval with Endogenous Submissions (October 25, 2000)
(working paper, on le with author). It should be noted that formal modeling of the type done here is not
for the faint of heart. For example, \comments" such as these are typical:
64Id. at 19-20. Carpenter's results on ideology and partisanship are fascinating. Although the results are statistically
insignicant, a more liberal House oversight committee and a majority-Democrat Senate are both associated with quicker
approvals. On the other hand, perhaps more in line with expectations, approvals are slower under a more liberal Senate
oversight committee, a Democrat-controlled House, and Democratic presidents.
65Id. at 21. This conrms the speculations of journalists and historians. See, e.g., Herbert Burkholz, FDA Follies 113
(1994).
66Id. at 24.
67
15Researchers who plan to empirically test this new model, or other of Carpenter's or Olson's models with
new data, should therefore have a solid background in at least propositional and predicate calculus. Specif-
ically, Carpenter and Ting are studying the strategic interaction between FDA and rms submitting drug
applications to FDA. This is important because a complete model of FDA decision-making requires an un-
derstanding of how rms will react to FDA's decision-making strategy, and how FDA will react to their
reaction, and so on.
According to the model, once a rm has a product it thinks will be protable, the rm must choose how
much of a delay (and, therefore, how much more testing) to impose on itself before seeking FDA approval.
The rm does not begin the process of deciding whether to submit or delay, under this model, until it is
satised with its own knowledge of how safe and eective the product is. Once FDA approval is sought, the
model assumes the rm's knowledge of its own product's safety/ecacy level. FDA must then decide how
much additional delay and testing is needed before \stopping" the process and approving or rejecting the
submission. Self-delaying is costly for a rm, but the longer it delays (and the more testing it does), the less
likely FDA is to impose additional delay and investigation costs on the rm, and the more likely FDA is
to rely on the rm's signals (true or false) about the quality of its product. Ultimately, FDA would like to
know what the rm knows { the product's true safety/ecacy level { but acquiring such knowledge is very
costly for FDA. This balancing act is what Carpenter and Ting formalize in their model.
As implied above, Carpenter and Ting's model assumes that there are at least some products that rms
would like to sell but that FDA would not approve. If the interests of the two parties were coextensive,
there would be no need for a rm to try to \convince" FDA that its product is safe and eective; the two
would simply collaborate to discover the truth. In this respect, Carpenter and Ting's model is comparable
to regulatory models advanced by other scholars. For example, an agency may overestimate its budgetary
needs to Congress to get more money, but if it overestimates too much, it risks being audited and getting
even less money.68 The agency nds equilibrium { and makes its decision { at the point where the risk of
being audited with a higher estimate outweighs the possible benet of getting more money. Likewise, the
rm submitting an application to FDA decides to submit at the very point when the costs imposed by any
additional delay outweigh the possible additional benets of signaling to FDA that sucient testing has been
done. FDA decides when to decide based, in part, on those signals.
A useful non-empirical examination of FDA's decision-making incentives from an organizational approach is
68See Jerey S. Banks, Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing, 33 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 670 (1989).
16David Leo Weimer's Organizational Incentives: Safe { and Available { Drugs.69 While FDA might ideally
outlaw only products that no fully-informed person would use, FDA has perfect information about neither
the products nor the preferences or benet-risk ratios of all the sub-populations of people it protects.70 Given
this lack of information, all FDA decisions must weigh in general terms the costs of keeping a product o the
market against the benets and risks of letting it on the market. Since FDA suers much greater political
punishment for letting a dangerous product on the market than for keeping a useful one o, the equation is
tilted toward conservatism.71 Much of the rest of Weimer's chapter explains in greater detail the incentives
underlying FDA's conservatism, the costs of FDA's inexibility, and possible solutions to the problem.
IV. The Bureaucratic Politics Model
This section will introduce the small number of works that pay special attention to the individuals who
come together to cause a particular outcome, instead of to organizational or governmental incentives and
rationality. This section will also briey describe one more study by Professor Olson which, although it
does not describe FDA decision-making per se, empirically analyzes the individual-level politics involved
in the passage of the 1984 Drug Price Competition Act (\DPCA") and the Patent Term Restoration Act
(\PTRA"). It is a useful piece for any researcher interested in the politics of pharmaceutical regulation in
general and not specically in FDA.
Herbert Kaufman's The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs72 asserts the importance of fed-
eral bureau chiefs in bureaucratic decision-making, and he incorporates six specic leadership positions into
69In Reforming Social Regulation: Alternative Public Policy Strategies 19 (LeRoy Graymer & Frederick Thompson
eds., 1982).
70See id. at 36-39.
71See, e.g., id. at 21.
72Herbert Kaufman, The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs (1981). Another valuable, but consid-
erably older, account of the power of bureau chiefs is Arthur W. Macmahon & John D. Millett, Federal Administrators:
A Biographical Approach to the Problem of Departmental Management (1939).
17his study (FDA commissioner among them). Beyond making the concededly easy argument that bureau
chiefs are important, though, Kaufman undertakes to describe how they run their agencies. Kaufman dis-
cusses how bureau chiefs acquire, evaluate, and use information, how they handle other governmental actors,
how and when they delegate tasks, how and when they develop routines, how they shape the current and
future operations of their agencies, and what personality qualities bureau chiefs need to succeed. There is
no chapter devoted specically to FDA, but examples of FDA commissioners' actions are woven throughout
the book to illustrate the propositions Kaufman advances about bureau chiefs in general or to carve out
exceptions to those propositions.73
The importance of the particular FDA commissioner to FDA decision-making is emphasized in a study by
B. Dan Wood and Richard W. Waterman.74 Wood and Waterman examined the tenure of Arthur Hayes as
FDA's commissioner. Hayes was appointed in April 1981 by Health and Human Services (\HHS") Secretary
Richard Schweiker as part of an eort by President Reagan's Task Force on Regulatory Relief to speed up
the new drug approval process. As expected, FDA approved more new drugs in 1981 than it had in any
year since the 1962 Amendments.75 But while there was strong political support for reducing drug approval
time and cost, there was no evidence of any political support for slackening FDA's enforcement functions.76
Wood and Waterman examine whether Hayes brought such a slackening about, regardless of the lack of an
executive mandate to do so.
73See, e.g., id. at 162-63. For example, one such proposition is that bureau chiefs generally desire more power and autonomy.
But that is not always the case. As Kaufman explains, FDA Commissioner Donald Kennedy opposed the recommendation of
the National Academy of Sciences to give FDA discretion to calculate the costs and benets of various food additives and to
devise an appropriate strategy for each additive. Otherwise, the FDA commissioner would be the target of political pressure
on all sides of debates on each additive.
74B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, supra note 8, at 27-76. The study was rst published in B. Dan Wood &
Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 85 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 801 (1991).
75See id. at 55.
76See id.
18Despite a gradual increase in FDA's budget throughout the early 1980s, food and drug establishment inspec-
tions declined consistently until they reached 60.22 percent below the pre-Hayes level.77 Product seizures
declined 43.9 percent in the rst quarter Hayes served as FDA commissioner and remained at that level
throughout the 1980s; legal actions (dened here as the sum of all prosecutions and injunctions obtained
by FDA) declined by 49.6 percent in the same quarter and also remained at that level.78 Given these data,
Wood and Waterman \posit a straightforward case of top agency leadership manipulating the activities of
an agency."79 Wood and Waterman empirically establish what Kaufman deduces by observation: the person
in the FDA commissioner's, or HHS secretary's, seat is an important determinant of how FDA behaves.
Rita Campbell's Drug Lag80 is perhaps the clearest example of a political science analysis of FDA using the
bureaucratic politics framework. Drug Lag is not a comprehensive study of FDA decision-making. Instead,
it is an account of how the various personalities inside FDA (and personalities outside FDA that had an
impact on FDA) reacted to the \drug lag" debate, written by one of the founding members of the National
Advisory Drug Committee. Any researcher wishing to examine a microcosm of FDA decision-making from
the bureaucratic politics or psychological point of view should not miss this book.
Finally, part of Mary Olson's Ph.D. dissertation,81 and a later article82 building on it, study why regulatory
reform proposals prior to the 1984 DPCA and PTRA were stalled, and why the 1984 legislation was actually
77Id. at 56.
78Id. at 57.
79Id. at 55.
80Rita Ricardo Campbell, Drug Lag: Federal Government Decision Making (1976)
81Mary K. Olson, The Eects of Drug Regulation and the Scope for Political Inuence (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Stanford University) (on le with University Microlms International).
82Mary K. Olson, Political Inuence and Regulatory Policy: The 1984 Drug Legislation, 32 Econ. Inquiry 363 (1994).
19enacted. Olson's results demonstrate that the political preferences (represented by ADA scores and campaign
contributions) of key congressional committee83 members favored the status quo over any proposed bills
before 1984, and that changes in House committee and subcommittee membership combined with a change
in party control of the Senate to create a mix of political preferences that instead favored reform over the
status quo. Olson explains that \as membership and preferences on these committees change over time, the
set of policies which can be supported by a majority on the committee will also change."84 Olson's results
also show that, while the wishes of a subcommittee chair (particularly, in this case, Henry Waxman) can
be stymied by the other subcommittee members, the chair (in addition to being able to prevent bills from
reaching the oor) can inuence the composition of the subcommittee over time, bringing the subcommittee
more in line with his or her preferences.
V. Miscellaneous Works
Three political science pieces would t so awkwardly into any one of the three models that to force them to
do so would be more misleading than helpful. These works explore the operations of FDA using more than
one framework, and would be useful references no matter what lens the future researcher uses to examine
FDA.
Paul Quirk's chapter on FDA in James Q. Wilson's The Politics of Regulation85 is perhaps the single most
indispensable political science piece on FDA, and certainly one of the most cited. In this chapter, Quirk
analyzes the politics of drug legislation in 1906, 1938, and 1962, claiming that the enactment of these laws
83Particularly the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, of which Henry Waxman was chair, and the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, of which Orrin Hatch was chair.
84Id. at 381.
85Paul J. Quirk, Food and Drug Administration, in The Politics of Regulation 191 (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980).
20depended on the overall political climate and was not necessarily intended to benet the industry, even
though the industry supported it.86 Quirk's telling of the history of drug legislation is notable in that it is
centered on politics and not on policy; individuals are vital to Quirk's account. Despite the politics orienta-
tion, however, Quirk includes discussion of the policy dilemmas inherent in drug regulation.
Quirk reviews internal (especially personnel) factors that account for FDA behavior. For example, Quirk ex-
plains that since FDA medical ocers \do little creative research; instead, they evaluate research submitted
by drug companies," FDA often has trouble recruiting top minds.87 Salary and working conditions at FDA
are also not comparable to what physicians can get in private practice. Managerial problems plagued the
Bureau of Drugs in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and internal conict has hindered FDA's drug approval
policy.88 If FDA is slow or inecient, then, it is partly because of the people there and not because of the
agency's incentives or the laws governing FDA.
Quirk also discusses in some detail several external factors that inuence FDA decision-making, such as
industry lobbying, consumer groups, public opinion, and congressional oversight. Quirk even tells one tale
(calling it the \exception that proves the rule") of attempted political intervention on behalf of a drug:
when FDA declared the combination antibiotic Panalba ineective, the Upjohn Company convinced HEW
Secretary Robert Finch to order FDA to grant Upjohn a hearing, but Finch's order was quickly reversed by
the House Committee on Government Operations.89 Presaging the Wood and Waterman study, Quirk also
points to presidential inuence through high-level FDA appointments.90 Finally, Quirk remarks that the
balance of all these external inuences \uctuates with events, with the rise and decline of social movements
86Id. at 201.
87Id. at 207.
88Id. at 207-08.
89Id. at 212.
90Id. at 217.
21and political organizations, with experience of the impact of previous regulatory decisions, and with broad
changes of public attitude."91
Stephen Ceccoli's Ph.D. dissertation92 oers a fascinating comparative political science approach to drug
regulation in the United States. Much of the dissertation adopts a rational actor view of American drug
regulation. Chapter 2, for example, is aimed at showing that the dierences between American and British
political institutions themselves explain variation in the political responsiveness of the drug regulatory agen-
cies as well as in the attitudes of regulatory ocials. Nevertheless, an organizational process framework is
evident in Ceccoli's discussion of FDA's recent shift away from its single-minded protection of the consumer to
its dual role of consumer protection and promotion of new medical treatments through quick drug approval;
FDA's \regulatory shift" was due to pressures from the anti-regulatory Reagan and Bush administrations,
consumer groups (particularly AIDS groups), and the pharmaceutical industry.93 Making the categorization
of this work particularly dicult is that Ceccoli consistently uses four factors in his analysis of regulatory
behavior: history and path dependence (the eect of the past and of routine on current practice), the degree
of goal consensus or controversy (i.e., the clarity of the legislative mandate), the level of political support the
agency gets, and nature of the relationship between the regulated industries and the agency. For the future
researcher, Ceccoli's dissertation also contains an excellent bibliography of government documents related to
the study of FDA.
A general work that serves as a good introduction to theories of regulatory politics in general and to FDA
behavior in particular is Sidney Shapiro and Joseph Tomain's Regulatory Law and Policy.94 It is structured
91Id. at 218.
92Stephen J. Ceccoli, The Politics of New Drug Approvals in the United States and Great Britain (1998) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Washington University) (on le with the Harvard Law School Library).
93Id. at 248-57.
94Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Regulatory Law and Policy (1998).
22like a casebook in that it contains excerpts from other sources followed by notes and questions. Chapter
3, \Regulation and Politics," provides a strong theoretical anchor for political science research on agency
decision-making. Chapter 11 contains a case study of FDA, including history, policy justications for current
drug law, and passages from scholarly debates on whether FDA should allow very ill people to access drugs
even if FDA has not approved them. The notes and questions to the case study provide a good discussion
of the policy debates involved in new drug approval.
VI. Conclusion
The current state of the political science literature on FDA is easy to describe because it has few internal
conicts. Not surprisingly, FDA decision-making is inuenced by a number of factors, including congressional
preferences (as manifested by, among other things, oversight activity and budget manipulation), presidential
preferences, personalities in FDA, agency incentives, and, in some circumstances, FDA's budget itself. The
weight of various factors depends on which industry is being aected and what type of decision { i.e., when
a decision is made or what the decision itself was { is being examined. The real use of a political science
analysis of FDA is in understanding which factors tend to matter most in a particular situation, and how
they will bring their inuence to bear, and why. The ultimate goal is the ability to predict what will happen
given a specic set of circumstances; that is why political science has even the smallest of claims to the term
\science."95
As should be clear from this essay, the political science literature on FDA exhibits a great variety. Never-
theless, it has notable gaps. First, nearly all of the empirical work and the vast majority of the work in
general focuses primarily on drug regulation. The eld would benet tremendously from a study of FDA
95The inability to make consistently accurate predictions does not undermine the pursuit's status as a science; astrophysics
has historically had this problem, and meteorology still does.
23decision-making regarding other FDA-regulated industries such as food, cosmetics, or animal feed. Second,
while political science works using the rational actor model or the organizational process model are relatively
easy to come by, fewer FDA-specic works adopt the bureaucratic politics model, and even fewer examine
FDA politics at the individual level beyond the post of FDA commissioner. This is, at least in part, due
to the informational problems associated with describing the decision-making process using that framework:
not only must such a description be intensely fact-specic and therefore limited both in scope and in broader
application, but the relevant facts are also very dicult to discover for anyone but FDA insiders. While
the organizational process model might be the most convenient analytical lens through which to examine
FDA, the study of FDA decision-making could use more carefully researched, individual-level accounts of
important FDA decisions.
The future researcher can take some comfort in the bibliographical completeness of this essay as of the time
it was written, but he or she should remember that it is \complete" only to the extent that it covers the
limited category of political science research (dened narrowly) specically on FDA. There are numerous
political science works on health care regulation or on the bureaucracy in general, and there are literally
thousands of books and articles not mentioned here that touch on some aspect of FDA. Economics, history,
law, psychology, biochemistry, and other disciplines can, of course, contribute to the study of how FDA
decides \who gets what, when, and how," or of \how goals [are] determined, conict resolved or managed,
standards set, and policy enforced."96 While there is { and ought to be { a porous barrier between disciplines
that examine a common target, some segregation, however debatable the dividing line, is necessary lest any
survey span the entire web of human knowledge.
96Wilson, supra note 85, at xi.
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